Rather than anonymizing social graphs by generalizing them to super nodes/edges or adding/removing nodes and edges to satisfy given privacy parameters, recent methods exploit the semantics of uncertain graphs to achieve privacy protection of participating entities and their relationships. These techniques anonymize a deterministic graph by converting it into an uncertain form. In this paper, we propose a general obfuscation model based on uncertain adjacency matrices that keep expected node degrees equal to those in the unanonymized graph. We analyze two recently proposed schemes and their fitting into the model. We also point out disadvantages in each method and present several elegant techniques to fill the gap between them. Finally, to support fair comparisons, we develop a new tradeoff quantifying framework by leveraging the concept of incorrectness. Experiments on large social graphs demonstrate the effectiveness of our schemes.
INTRODUCTION
Graphs represent a rich class of data observed in daily life where entities are described by vertices and their connections are characterized by edges. With the emergence of increasingly complex networks [15] , the research community requires large and reliable graph data to conduct Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. ASIA CCS '15, April 14-17, 2015 in-depth studies. However, this requirement usually conflicts with privacy rights of data contributing entities. Naive approaches like removing user ids from a social graph are not effective, leaving users open to privacy risks, especially re-identification attacks [1] [10] . Therefore, many graph anonymization schemes have been proposed [27, 12, 28, 4, 24, 21] .
Given an unlabeled undirected graph, the existing anonymization methods fall into five main categories. The first category includes random addition, deletion and switching of edges to prevent the re-identification of nodes or edges. The methods in the second category provide k-anonymity [20] by deterministic edge additions or deletions, assuming attacker's background knowledge regarding certain properties of its target nodes. The third class of techniques, generalization, cluster nodes into super nodes of size at least k. The methods in the fourth category assign edge probabilities to add uncertainty to the true graph. The edges probabilities may be computed explicitly as in [2] or implicitly via random walks [14] . Finally, several schemes for private graph data release [23, 25] are based on differential privacy [7] . Note that the third and fourth categories induce possible world semantics, i.e., we can retrieve sample graphs that are consistent with the anonymized output graph.
The fourth category is a recent class of methods which leverage the semantics of edge probability to inject uncertainty to a given deterministic graph, converting it into an uncertain one. Most of the schemes in this category are scalable, i.e. runnable on million-scale graphs or more. As an example, Boldi et al. [2] introduced the concept of (k,ǫ)obfuscation (denoted as (k, ǫ)-obf), where k ≥ 1 is a desired level of obfuscation and ǫ ≥ 0 is a tolerance parameter. However, the pursuit for minimum standard deviation σ in (k,ǫ)-obf has high impact on node privacy and high privacyutility tradeoff. Edge rewiring method based on random walks (denoted as RandWalk ) in [14] also introduces uncertainty to edges as we show in section 4. This scheme suffers from high lower bounds for utility error despite its excellent privacy-utility tradeoff.
Motivated by (k,ǫ)-obf and RandWalk, we propose in this work a general model for anonymizing graphs based on edge uncertainty. Both (k,ǫ)-obf and RandWalk are captured by the model. We point out disadvantages in (k,ǫ)-obf and RandWalk, the tradeoff gap between them and present several elegant techniques to fill this gap.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a general model called uncertain adjacency matrix (UAM) for anonymizing graphs via edge uncer-tainty semantics (Section 3). The key property of this model is that expected degrees of all nodes must be unchanged.
• We show how (k,ǫ)-obf and RandWalk fit into UAM and analyze their disadvantages (Section 4). Then we describe Mixture as a simple mitigation.
• We introduce the Variance Maximizing (MaxVar) scheme (Section 5) that satisfies all the properties of UAM. It achieves good privacy-utility tradeoff by using two key observations: nearby potential edges and maximization of total node degree variance via a simple quadratic program. Another advantage of MaxVar is its full applicability to directed graphs.
• We conduct a comparative study of aforementioned approaches in a empirical privacy-utility framework by putting forward the distortion measure (Section 6). We show the effectiveness of our gap-filling solutions (Section 7) on three real large graphs. Table 1 summarizes notations used in this paper. 
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RELATED WORK
There is a vast literature on graph perturbation that deserves a survey. In this section, we enumerate only several groups of ideas that are related to our proposed schemes.
Anonymizing unlabeled vertices for node privacy. In unlabeled graphs, node identifiers are numbered in an arbitrary manner after removing their labels. An attacker aims at reidentifying nodes solely based on their structural information. For this line of graphs, node privacy protection implies link privacy. Techniques of adding and removing edges, nodes can be done randomly or deterministically. Random perturbation is a naive approach and usually used as a baseline method. More guided approaches consist of k-neighborhood [27] , k-degree [12] , k-automorphism [28] , ksymmetry [24] , k-isomorphism [4] and k 2 -degree [21] . These schemes provide k-anonymity [20] semantics and usually rely on heuristics to avoid combinatorial intractability. Kautomorphism, k-symmetry, and k-isomorphism can resist any structural attacks by exploiting the inherent symmetry in graph. k 2 -degree addresses the friendship attacks, based on the vertex degree pair of an edge. Ying and Wu [26] propose a spectrum preserving approach which wisely chooses edge pairs to switch in order to keep the spectrum of the adjacency matrix from varying too much. The clearest disadvantage of the above schemes is that they are inefficient on large scale graphs.
Apart from the two above categories, perturbation techniques have other categories that settle on possible world semantics. Hay et al. [10] generalize a network by clustering nodes and publish graph summarization of super nodes and super edges. The utility of this scheme is limited. On the other hand, Boldi et al.
[2] take the uncertain graph approach. With edge probabilities, the output graph can be used to generate sample graphs by independent edge sampling. Our approach belongs to this class of techniques with different formulation and better privacy-utility tradeoff. Note that in k-symmetry [4] , the output sample graphs are also possible worlds of the symmetric intermediate graph.
Anonymizing labeled vertices for link privacy. If nodes are labeled, we are only concerned about the link disclosure risk. For example, Mittal et al. [14] employ an edge rewiring method based on random walks to keep the mixing time tunable and prevent link re-identification by Bayesian inference. This method is effective for social network based systems, e.g. Sybil defense, DHT routing. Link privacy is also described in [26] for Random Switch, Random Add/Del. Interestingly, RandWalk [14] can also be used for unlabeled graphs as shown in Section 4.
Differential privacy and generative graph models. Differential privacy [7] hides the participation of an item in a dataset. It is applied not only to tabular data but also to graph data, e.g. [23, 25] . The common paradigm is three-phase as follows. First, certain statistics or model are extracted from the original graph. Then, some noise is added to the true statistics/model to guarantee differential privacy. Finally, the noisy statistics/model is used to generate sample anonymized graphs.
Min entropy, Shannon entropy and incorrectness measure. We now survey commonly used notions of privacy metrics. Min entropy [19] quantifies the largest probability gap between the posterior and prior over all items in the input dataset. K-anonymity has the same semantics with the corresponding min entropy of log 2 k. So we say k-anonymity based perturbation schemes belong to min entropy. Shannon entropy argued in [3] and [2] is another choice of privacy metrics. The third metrics that we use in this paper is the incorrectness measure. Given the prior information (e.g. node degree in the true graph) and the posterior information harvested from the anonymized output, incorrectness measure is the number of incorrect guesses made by the attacker. This measure gauges the distortion caused by the anonymization algorithm. An empirical comparison of early privacy model like k-anonymity and the emerging differential privacy is given in [5] .
A GENERAL MODEL
This section starts with definitions and common assumptions on uncertain graphs. It then introduces a general model UAM via semantics of edge uncertainty. 
Uncertain Graph
Let G = (V, E, p) be an uncertain undirected graph, where V is the set of nodes, E is the set of edges, p : E → (0, 1] is the function that gives an existence probability to each edge (see Fig.2b ). The common assumption is on the independence of edge probabilities. Following the possibleworlds semantics in relational data [6] , the uncertain graph G induces a set {G = (V, EG)} of 2 |E| deterministic graphs (worlds), each is defined by a subset of E. The probability of G = (V, EG) ⊑ G is:
(1)
As an example, the uncertain graph in Fig.2b has 2 5 possible graphs and the graph with three edges (v1, v2), (v2, v3)(v3, v4) has probability of P (G) = 0.3×0.7× 0.4 × (1 − 0.8) × (1 − 0.9) = 0.00168. Note that deterministic graphs are also uncertain graphs with all existing edges having probabilities 1.
Uncertain Adjacency Matrix (UAM)
Given the true undirected graph G0, an uncertain graph G constructed from G0 must have its uncertain adjacency matrix A satisfying 1. Aij = Aji (symmetry); 2. Aij ∈ [0, 1] and Aii = 0 (no multiedges or selfloops);
3.
n j=1 Aij = di(G0) i = 1..n, (expected degrees of all nodes must be unchanged).
While the constraints (1) and (2) are straightforward for uncertain undirected graph, the third constraint is novel and central to our model of UAM. It stems from the need of preserving the degree sequence of graph which is useful for degree distribution estimation, e.g. in [9] . In terms of dKseries [13] , the degree sequence is d1-series, the first moment of graph. The higher moments like d2-series are left for future work.
By relaxing (2) to (2'): Aii ≥ 0 and Aij ≥ 0, we allow graphs with selfloops and multiedges ( Fig. 1a ).
APPLICATION OF UAM
In this section, we analyze several existing and novel schemes using the model of UAM.
RandWalk Scheme

Preliminary Results
We first define the transition matrix PRW which is right stochastic (i.e. non-negative and row sums equal to 1) as follows (note that we use the short notation di = di(G0))
. We prove two lemmas on properties of the products AP and AP t where P is right stochastic.
Lemma 4.1. For an adjacency matrix A and a right stochastic matrix P , the product AP is non-negative and has row sums equal to those of A.
Proof. The non-negativity of AP is trivial. The sum
For a deterministic graph G possessing adjacency matrix A and PRW , the product B (t) = AP t−1 RW is also symmetric.
Proof. We prove the result by induction. The case t = 1 is trivial. We prove that for any t ≥ 2, B
When t = 2, B
(2)
Because G is undirected, the set of all pt(i, j) is equal to the set of all pt(j, i), so B
We prove the uniqueness of PRW as follows Proposition 4.3. Given a deterministic graph G with adjacency matrix A, there exists one and only one right stochastic matrix P that satisfies Puv = 0 for all (u, v) / ∈ G and AP t is symmetric for all t ≥ 0. The unique solution is P = PRW .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Analysis
Now we show how RandWalk [14] fit into the model of UAM. We should mention that RandWalk is proposed only for link privacy analysis in [14] whereas the current work is on node privacy. Algorithm 1 depicts the steps of Rand-Walk. As we show below, the trial-and-error condition in Line 6 makes RandWalk hard to analyze 1 . So we modify it by removing the condition and using parameter α instead of 1.0 in Line 12 2 (see Algorithm 2). When α = 0.5, all edges (u, z) are assigned with probability 0.5. In RandWalk-mod, we add a check for du = 1 (Line 8) to keep the total degree of G ′ equal to that of G, which is missing in RandWalk. Note that RandWalk-mod accepts selfloops and multiedges (i.e. it satisfies the relaxed constraint (2'), not (2)).
Algorithm 1 RandWalk(G0, t, M ) [14] Input: undirected graph G 0 , walk length t and maximum loop count M Output: anonymized graph G ′ 1: G ′ = null 2: for u in G 0 do 3:
z is the terminal node of the random walk 9:
loop + +
10:
if loop ≤ M then
11:
if count == 1 then
12:
add (u, z) to G ′ with probability 1.0 13:
if j is a neighbor of i but not the first one 0 otherwise.
We show that RandWalk-mod can be formulated as an uncertain adjacency matrix ARW = (AP t−1
RW is equivalent to computations in lines 2-6 and Q + Q T is equivalent to computations in lines 7-13. We use Q + Q T instead of Q due to the fact that when the edge (u, z) is added to G ′ with probability Quz, the edge (z, u) is also assigned the same probability. We come up with the following theorem. We investigate the limit case when t → ∞ (i.e.
The following theorem quantifies the number of selfloops and multiedges in B ∞ RW for power-law (PL) graphs and sparse Erdös-Renyi (ER) random graphs [15] . 
is the Riemann zeta function defined only for γ > 1; the number of multiedges is zero.
For sparse ER random graphs with λ = np constant where p is the edge probability, the number of selfloops in B ∞ RW is λ + 1; the number of multiedges is zero.
3 This implies a mistake in Theorem 3 of [14] Algorithm 2 RandWalk-mod(G0, t, α) Input: undirected graph G 0 , walk length t and probability α Output: anonymized graph G ′ 1: G ′ = null 2: for u in G 0 do 3:
z is the terminal node of the random walk 7:
if count == 1 then 8:
if du == 1 then 9:
add (u, z) to G ′ with probability 0.5 10: 
Edge Switching Scheme
In edge switching (EdgeSwitch) approaches (e.g. [26] ), two edges (u, v), (w, t) are chosen and switched to (u, t), (w, v) if aut = awv = 0 ( Fig. 1b ). This is done in s switches. Using the switching matrix S, we represent 1-step EdgeSwitch in the form AS = A (Equation (4)).
The switching matrix S is feasible if and only if auwavt = 0. Note that in the full form, S is n×n matrix with the n−4 remaining elements on diagonal are 1, other off-diagonal are 0. In general, S is not right stochastic and this happens only if auw = avt = 0. For s-step EdgeSwitch A s i=1 Si = A. If ∀i, Si is right stochastic (i.e. we choose edges (u, v), (w, t) such that auw = avt = 0), then Lemma 4.1 applies.
(k, ǫ)-obf Scheme
Given the deterministic adjacency matrix A, we can directly construct A that satisfies all three constraints (1),(2) and (3) of UAM. (k,ǫ)-obf [2] introduces such an approach. . Let P be a vertex property, k ≥ 1 be a desired level of obfuscation, and ǫ ≥ 0 be a tolerance parameter. The uncertain graph G is said to k-obfuscate a given vertex v ∈ G with respect to P if the entropy of the distribution Y P (v) over the vertices of G is greater than or equal to log 2 k:
Construction and Limitations
The uncertain graph G is a (k, ǫ)-obf with respect to property P if it k-obfuscates at least (1 − ǫ)n vertices in G with respect to P. ✷ Given the true graph G0 (Fig.2a ), the basic idea of (k, ǫ)obf ( Fig.2b) is to transfer the probabilities from existing edges to potential (non-existing) edges to satisfy Definition 4.1. For each existing sampled edge e, it is assigned a probability 1 − re where re ← Rσ (Fig. 2c ) and for each non-existing sampled edge e ′ , it is assigned a probability r e ′ ← Rσ. Table 2 gives an example of how to compute degree entropy for the uncertain graph in Fig. 2b . Here vertex property P is the node degree. Each row in the left side is the degree distribution for the corresponding node. For instance, v1 has degree 0 with probability (1−0.8).
(1−0.3).(1−0.9) = 0.014. The right side normalizes values in each column (i.e. in each degree value) to get distributions Y P (v) . The entropy H(Y P (v) ) for each degree value is shown in the bottom row. Given k = 3, log 2 k = 1.585, then v1, v3 with true degree 2 and v2, v4 with true degree 1 satisfy (5) . Therefore, ǫ = 0. While (k, ǫ)-obf provides a novel technique to come up with an uncertain version of the graph, the specific approach in [2] has two drawbacks. First, it formulated the problem as the minimization of σ. With small values of σ, re highly concentrates around zero, so existing sampled edges have probabilities nearly 1 and non-existing sampled edges are assigned probabilities almost 0. Simple rounding techniques can easily reveal the true graph. Even if the graph owner only publishes sample graphs, the re-identification attacks are still effective as we show in Section 7. Note that in [2], the found values of σ vary in a wide range from 10 −1 to 10 −8 . Second, the approach in [2] does not consider the locality (subgraph) of nodes in selecting pairs of nodes for establishing potential edges. As shown in [8] , subgraph-wise perturbation effectively reduces structural distortion.
Furthermore, the expected degrees of nodes in (k, ǫ)-obf are approximately unchanged due to the fact that re, r e ′ are nearly zero by small σ. So (k,ǫ)-obf satisfies the constraints (1) and (2) but it only approximately satisfies the constraint (3) of UAM. To remedy these shortcomings, we present the MaxVar approach in Section 5. It adds potential edges to G0, then tries to find the assignment of edge probabilities such that the expected node degrees are unchanged while the total variance is maximized. A comparison among schemes is also shown in Section 5.3.
Mixture Scheme
In this section, we present the Mixture approach applicable to RandWalk-mod, (k, ǫ)-obf, MaxVar and EdgeSwitch. Its UAM Ap is parametrized by p, with the output sample graph Gp. Given the true graph G0 and an anonymized
and Ap satisfies three constraints (1) (2') and (3).
If there exists Pmix with constraint
, then Mixture can be simulated by the RandWalk-mod approach with the transition matrix Pmix.
Partition Scheme
Another approach that can apply to RandWalk-mod, (k, ǫ)-obf, MaxVar and EdgeSwitch is the Partition approach. Given true graph G0, this divide-and-conquer strategy first partitions G0 into disjoint subgraphs sG, then it applies one of the above anonymization schemes on subgraphs to get anonymized subgraphs sG. Finally, it combines sG to obtain G. Note that the partitioning may cause orphan edges as in MaxVar (Section 5). Those edges must be copied to G to keep node degrees unchanged.
VARIANCE MAXIMIZING SCHEME
We introduce the Variance Maximizing (MaxVar) scheme as an instance of the UAM. We start this section with the formulation of MaxVar in the form of quadratic programming based on two key observations (Section 5.1). Then we describe the anonymization algorithm (Section 5.2) and compare MaxVar with the aforementioned schemes (Section 5.3).
Formulation
Two key observations underpinning the MaxVar approach are presented as follows.
Observation #1: Maximizing Degree Variance
We argue that efficient countermeasures against structural attacks should hinge on node degrees. If a node and its neighbors have their degrees changed, the re-identification risk is reduced significantly. Consequently, instead of replicating local structures as in k-anonymity based approaches [27, 12, 28, 4, 24, 21] , we can deviate the attacks by changing node degrees probabilistically. For example, node v1 in Fig.2a has degree 2 with probability 1.0 whereas in Fig.2b , its degree gets four possible values {0, 1, 2, 3} with probabilities {0.014, 0.188, 0.582, 0.216} respectively. Generally, given edge probabilities of node u as p1, p2, ..p du(G) , the degree of u is a sum of independent Bernoulli random variables, so its expected value is
pi and its variance is
pi(1 − pi). If we naively target the maximum (local) degree variance without any constraints, the naive solution is at pi = 0.5 ∀i. However, such an assignment distorts graph structure severely and deteriorates the utility. Instead, by following the model of UAM, we have the constraint du(G) i=1 pi = du(G0). Note that the minimum variance of an uncertain graph is 0 and corresponds to the case G has all edges being deterministic, e.g. when G = G0 and in switching-edge based approaches. In the following section, we show an interesting result relating the total degree variance with the variance of edit distance.
Variance of Edit Distance
The edit distance between two deterministic graphs G, G ′ is defined as:
A well-known result about the expected edit distance between the uncertain graph G and the deterministic graph
Correspondingly, the variance of edit distance is
We proved in the following theorem that the variance of edit distance is the sum of all edges' variance (total degree variance) and it does not depend on the choice of G.
Theorem 5.1. ( [16] ) Assume that G(V, E, p) has k uncertain edges e1, e2, ..., e k and G ⊑ G (i.e. EG ⊆ E). The edit distance variance is V ar[D(G, G)] = k i=1 pi(1−pi) and does not depend on the choice of G.
Observation #2: Proposing Nearby Edges
As indicated by Leskovec et al. [11] , real graphs reveal two temporal evolution properties: densification power law and shrinking diameters. Community Guided Attachment (CGA) model [11] , which produces densifying graphs, is an example of a hierarchical graph generation model in which the linkage probability between nodes decreases as a function of their relative distance in the hierarchy. With regard to this observation, (k, ǫ)-obf, by heuristically making potential edges solely based on node degree discrepancy, produces many inter-community edges. Shortest-path based statistics will be reduced due to these edges. MaxVar, in contrast, tries to mitigate the structural distortion by proposing only nearby potential edges before assigning edge probabilities. Another evidence is from [22] where Vazquez analytically proved that Nearest Neighbor can explain the power-law for degree distribution, clustering coefficient and average degree 
Algorithms
Overview
The intuition behind the new approach is to formulate the perturbation problem as a quadratic programming problem. Given the true graph G0 and the number of potential edges allowed to be added np, the scheme has three phases. The first phase tries to partition G0 into s subgraphs, each one with ns = np/s potential edges connecting nearby nodes (with default distance 2, i.e. friend-of-friend ). The second phase formulates a quadratic program for each subgraph with the constraint of unchanged node degrees to produce the uncertain subgraphs sG with maximum edge variance. The third phase combines the uncertain subgraphs sG into G and publishes several sample graphs. The three phases are illustrated in Fig. 3 .
By keeping the degrees of nodes in the perturbed graph, our approach is similar to the edge switching approaches (e.g. [26] ) but ours is more subtle as we do it implicitly and the switching occurs not necessarily on pairs of edges.
Graph Partitioning
Because of the complexity of exact quadratic programming (Section 5.2.3), we need a pre-processing phase to divide the true graph G0 into subgraphs and run the optimization on each subgraph. Given the number of subgraphs s, we run METIS 4 to get almost equal-sized subgraphs with minimum number of inter-subgraph edges. Each subgraph has ns potential edges added before running the quadratic program. This phase is outlined in Algorithm 3.
Quadratic Programming
By assuming the independence of edges, the total degree variance of G = (V, E, p) for edit distance (Theorem 5.1) is:
The last equality in (7) is due to the constraint that the expected node degrees are unchanged (i.e. 
pi is equal to |EG 0 |. By targeting the maximum edge variance, we come up with the following quadratic program.
The objective function reflects the privacy goal (i.e. sample graphs do not highly concentrate around the true graph) while the expected degree constraints aim to preserve the utility.
By dividing the large input graph into subgraphs, we solve independent quadratic optimization problems. Because each edge belongs to at most one subgraph and the expected node degrees in each subgraph are unchanged, it is straightforward to show that the expected node degrees in G are also unchanged. We have a proposition on problem feasibility and an upper bound for the total variance. Proof. The feasibility is due to the fact that {pe|pe = 1 ∀e ∈ EG 0 and pe = 0 otherwise} is a feasible point. Let ku be the number of potential edges incident to node u. By requiring u's expected degree to be unchanged, we have v∈N (u) puv = du. Applying Cauchy-Schwarz inequal-
du+ku . Now we take the sum over all nodes to get the following
where the last equality is again due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Comparison of Schemes
All the schemes mentioned in the current work are about node-level anonymization. It means we directly manipulate the nodes and their edges. In differentially private schemes such as [23, 25] , node signatures are indirectly anonymized via noisy graph statistics/models and graph regeneration. Therefore, all nodes' identities in the output cannot be linked to the original graphs. The incorrectness measure (Section 6.1) is not applicable, so we exclude such schemes from the comparison. Table 3 shows the comparison of schemes we investigate so far. Only MaxVar and EdgeSwitch satisfy all three properties (1),(2) and (3). The next two propositions quantify the TV of (k, ǫ)-obf and RandWalk-mod. 
depends on the mixed scheme Partition depends on the scheme used in subgraphs
The expressions of E[re], E[r 2 e ] are given in (9) and (10). Proof. In (k, ǫ)-obf, m existing edges are assigned probabilities 1 − re while np potential edges are assigned probabilities re. Therefore, the total variance is
The normalization constant C = 0.5erf(1/σ √ 2) where erf is the error function. Basic integral computations (change of variable and integration by parts) give us the formulas for E[re] and E[r 2 e ] as follows
Note that for σ ≤ 0.1, C ≈ 1 and e −1/2σ 2 ≈ 0, so Note that the Kt increases with t and when t is equal to the diameter of G, Kt = n 2 . Therefore, the upper bound of T VRW (t) converges very fast to m, compatible with the results in the limit cases of PL and ER random graphs. By propositions 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, we roughly conclude that
Directed Graphs
For directed graphs, the UAM model can be extended in several ways. We can apply the constraint of unchanged expected degree to in-degrees, out-degrees or both in/outdegrees of nodes.
In the case of unchanged out-degrees, it is straightforward to verify that RandWalk-mod still keeps the expected outdegrees of all nodes (note that we have to double the probabilities of adding every (u, v) due to the directionality of edges). The case of unchanged in-degrees needs reverse random walks (i.e. walks on in-edges) and the same conclusion holds. However, if we require both expected in/out-degrees of nodes to be unchanged, there exists no such randomwalks. This is not the case for (k, ǫ)-obf and MaxVar. For MaxVar, the constraints in (8) is updated to
Interestingly, in the case of unchanged out-degrees, Max-Var has a trivial solution puv = d + u (G0)/d + u (G) due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. The case of unchanged indegrees is similar. Because the main focus of this work is on undirected graphs, we leave the full analysis of UAM on directed graphs for future work.
QUANTIFYING FRAMEWORK
This section describes an empirical framework for privacy and utility quantification of anonymization methods.
Privacy Measurement
We focus on structural re-identification attacks under various models of attacker's knowledge as shown in [10] . We quantify the privacy of an anonymized graph as the sum of re-identification probabilities of all nodes in the graph. We differentiate closed-world from open-world adversaries. For example, when a closed-world adversary knows that Bob has three neighbors, this fact is exact. An open-world adversary in this case would learn only that Bob has at least three neighbors. We consider the result of structural query Q on a node u as the node signature sigQ(u). Given a query Q, nodes having the same signatures form an equivalence class. So given the true graph G0 and an output anonymized graph G * , the privacy is measured as in the following example. Example 6.1. Assuming that we have G0 of 8 nodes.
The node signatures of G0 are s1{1, 2, 3}, s2{4, 5}, s3{6, 7, 8}.
The node signatures of G * are s1{1, 2, 6}, s2{4, 7}, s3{3, 8}, s4{5} respectively. The re-identification probabilities in G * of nodes 1,2 are 1 3 , of nodes 4,8 are 1 2 , of nodes 3,5,6,7 are 0s. And the privacy score of G * is 1 3 + 1 3 + 1 2 + 1 2 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 1.66. In G0, the privacy score is 1 3 + 1 3 + 1 3 + 1 2 + 1 2 + 1 3 + 1 3 + 1 3 = 3, equal to the number of equivalence classes.
We consider two privacy scores in this paper.
• H1 score uses node degree as the node signature, i.e.
we assume that the attacker knows apriori degrees of all nodes.
• H2open uses the set (not multiset) of degrees of node's friends as the node signature. For example, if a node has 6 neighbors and the degrees of those neighbors are {1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 5}, then its signature for H2open attack is {1, 2, 3, 5}.
Higher-order scores like H2 (exact multiset of neighbors' degrees) or H3 (exact multiset of neighbor-of-neighbors' degrees) induce much higher privacy scores of the true graph G0 (in the order of |V |) and represent less meaningful metrics for privacy.
Utility Measurement
Following [2] and [26] , we consider three groups of statistics for utility measurement: degree-based statistics, shortest-path based statistics and clustering statistics.
Degree-based statistics -Number of edges: SNE = 1 2 v∈V dv -Average degree: SAD = 1 n v∈V dv -Maximal degree: SMD = maxv∈V dv -Degree variance: SDV = 1 n v∈V (dv − SAD) 2 -Power-law exponent of degree sequence: SP L is the estimate of γ assuming the degree sequence follows a power-law
Shortest path-based statistics -Average distance: SAP D is the average distance among all pairs of vertices that are path-connected.
-Effective diameter: SEDiam is the 90-th percentile distance among all path-connected pairs of vertices.
-Connectivity length: SCL is defined as the harmonic mean of all pairwise distances in the graph.
-Diameter : SDiam is the maximum distance among all path-connected pairs of vertices.
Clustering statistics -Clustering coefficient: SCC = 3N ∆ N 3 where N∆ is the number of triangles and N3 is the number of connected triples.
All of the above statistics are computed on sample graphs generated from the uncertain output G. In particular, to estimate shortest-path based measures, we use Approximate Neighbourhood Function (ANF) [17] . The diameter is lower bounded by the longest distance among all-destination breadth-first-searches from 1,000 randomly chosen nodes.
EVALUATION
In this section, our evaluation aims to show the disadvantages of (k, ǫ)-obf and RandWalk/RandWalk-mod as well as the gap between them. We then illustrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the gap-filling approaches MaxVar and Mixture. The effectiveness is measured by privacy scores (lower is better) and the relative error of utility (lower is better). The efficiency is measured by the running time. All algorithms are implemented in Python and run on a desktop PC with Intel Core i7-4770@ 3.4Ghz, 16GB memory. We use MOSEK 5 as the quadratic solver.
Three large real-world datasets are used in our experiments 6 . dblp is a co-authorship network where two authors are connected if they publish at least one paper together. amazon is a product co-purchasing network where the graph contains an undirected edge from i to j if a product i is frequently co-purchased with product j. youtube is a videosharing web site that includes a social network. The graph 5 http://mosek.com/ 6 http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html 
(k, ǫ)-obf and RandWalk
We report the performance of (k, ǫ)-obf in Table 4 . We keep the number of potential edges equal to m (default value in [2]) and vary σ. We find that the scheme achieves low relative errors only at small σ. However, privacy scores, especially H2open, rise fast (up to 50% compared to the true graph). This fact incurs high privacy-utility tradeoff as confirmed in Table 7 . Table 5 shows the performance similarity between Rand-Walk and RandWalk-mod except the case of youtube and for t = 2 in amazon. Because RandWalk-mod satisfies the third constraint, it benefits several degree-based statistics while the existence of selfloops and multiedges does not impact much on shortest-path based metrics. RandWalk misses a lot of edges at t = 2 (see footnote 1 in Section 4.1). The remarkable characteristics of random-walk schemes are the very low privacy scores and the high relative errors (lowerbounded around 8 to 10%). Clearly, there is a gap between high tradeoffs in (k, ǫ)-obf and high relative errors in Rand-Walk where MaxVar and Mixture may play their roles.
Effectiveness of MaxVar
We assess privacy and utility of MaxVar by varying the number of potential edges np. The results are shown in Table 6 . As for privacy scores, if we increase np, we gain better privacy as we allow more edge switches. Due to the expected degree constraints in the quadratic program, all degree-based metrics vary only a little.
We observe the near linear relationships between H1, rel.err and the number of replaced edges |EG 0 \ EG| in Figures 4a, 4c and near quadratic relationship of H2open against |EG 0 \ EG| in Fig.4b . The ratio of replaced edges in Figures  4a,4b and 4c is defined as The runtime of MaxVar consists of time for (1) partitioning G0, (2) adding friend-of-friend edges to subgraphs, (3) solving quadratic subproblems and (4) combining uncertain subgraphs to get G. We report the runtime in Fig.4d . As we can see, the total runtime is in several minutes and the runtime of the partitioning step is almost negligible. Increasing np gives rise to the runtime in steps 2,3 and 4 and the trends are nearly linear. The runtime on youtube is three times longer than on the other two datasets, almost linear to their data sizes. Table 7 shows comparisons between MaxVar, (k, ǫ)-obf and RandWalk/RandWalk-mod. The column tradeoff is H2open ×rel.err as we conjecture the quadratic and linear behavior of H2open and rel.err respectively (Figures 4b and  4c ). We omit the column H1 × rel.err because they are almost equal for all schemes considered in this work. Clearly, MaxVar gains better privacy-utility tradeoffs than (k, ǫ)-obf, but worse than RandWalk, RandWalk-mod. However, Max-Var has its own merit as a gap-filling solution. Figures 5a,5b and 5c show that while RandWalk, RandWalk-mod have the best tradeoffs, they suffer from high lower bounds for utility. In other words, if the dataset allows higher privacy risk for better utility (lower rel.err) then the usage of two random walk based solutions may be limited. The simple solution Mixture also fills the gap. We omit EdgeSwitch due to its worst tradeoffs.
Comparative Evaluation
In addition to the re-identification scores H1 and H2open, we also compute ǫ for k ∈ {30, 50, 100} to have a fair comparison with (k, ǫ)-obf. Table 7 shows that MaxVar has the best (k, ǫ) scores. The number of potential edges used in Max-Var could be 20% of |EG 0 |, much less than that of (k, ǫ)-obf (100% for c = 2 [2]). MaxVar and RandWalk/RandWalkmod have |EG 0 \ EG| ≃ |EG \ EG 0 | and these two quantities are higher than those of (k, ǫ)-obf where the number of edges is preserved only at small σ. RandWalk and RandWalk-mod do not have many edges preserved due to their rewiring nature. |EG 0 \ EG| increases slowly in MaxVar because the 
CONCLUSION
We provide a general view of graph anonymization based on the semantics of edge uncertainty. Via the model of UAM with the constraint of unchanged expected degree for all nodes, we analyze recently proposed schemes and explain why there exists a gap between them by comparing the total degree variance. We propose MaxVar, a novel anonymization scheme exploiting two key observations: maximizing the total degree variance while keeping the expected degrees of all nodes unchanged and using nearby potential edges. We also investigate an elegant Mixture approach that together with MaxVar fill the gap between (k, e)-obf and RandWalk. Furthermore, we promote the usage of incorrectness measure for privacy assessment in a new quantifying framework rather than Shannon entropy and min-entropy (k-anonymity). The experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods. Our work may incite several directions for future research including (1) novel constructions of uncertain graphs based on the model of UAM (2) deeper analysis on the privacy-utility relationships in MaxVar (e.g. explaining the near linear and near quadratic curves) (3) study on weighted, directed and bipartite graphs. Proof. Lemma 4.2 shows that P = PRW satisfies Puv = 0 for all (u, v) / ∈ G and AP t is symmetric for all t ≥ 0. To prove that this is the unique solution, we repeat the formula in the proof of Lemma 4.2. Let B (t) = AP t−1 , then B (t) ij = pt(i,j) k∈pt(i,j),k =i,j P k,k+1 where k + 1 implies the successive node of k in pt(i, j). Because B (t) ji has the same number of products as B (t) ij (i.e. the number of paths of length t), B (t) is symmetric if and only if corresponding products are equal, i.e. k∈pt(i,j),k =i,j P k,k+1 = k∈pt(j,i),k =i,j P k,k+1 . At t = 2, for any path (i, k, j) we must have P kj = P ki . Along with the requirement that P is right stochastic, i.e. i P ki = 1, we obtain P ki = 1/d k . This is exactly PRW .
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.5
Proof. For power-law graphs, the node degree distribution is P (k) = k −γ ζ(γ) . The number of selfloops n P L sl in B ∞
RW
is the sum of elements on the main diagonal. To prove that there is no multiedge in B ∞ RW we show that all elements in B ∞ RW are less than 1. This is equivalent to show dmax < √ 2m. We use the constraint that the number of nodes with degree dmax must be at least 1, i.e. Similar to the case of PL graphs, we show that dmax < √ 2m where dmax = max k ne −λ λ k k! ≥ 1 = max k k! λ k ≤ ne −λ . Using the basic facts k k/2 ≤ k! and k > λ we get k k/2 λ k ≤ ne −λ < n, so k < n 2/k λ 2 < √ nλ = √ 2m as long as n is sufficiently large and λ ≥ 4. So we conclude n ER me = 0.
